

SECRET

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #1850-81

1 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer  
for Warning

SUBJECT : One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W  
Staff

You requested yesterday that I provide you some thoughts on moving the management side of the proposed NIO/W staff to the IC Staff (reconstituted).

1. Responsibilities: DCID 1/5 assigns the NIO/W the following warning responsibilities:

- i. To oversee analysis of intelligence from all sources which might provide warning. In particular, he should be alert to alternate interpretations within the Community and assess these with a view to the need for issuance of warning. He should encourage consultation and substantive discussion at all levels in the Community.
- ii. To recommend to the Director or Deputy Director of Central Intelligence the issuance of warning to the President and National Security Council, and to ensure the dissemination of such warning within and by the organizations of the Intelligence Community. When time is of the essence, the National Intelligence Officer may issue such warning directly to the President and the National Security Council, with concurrent dissemination to the Director and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and senior officers of the Intelligence Community.
- iii. To advise the Deputy Director for Collection Tasking and Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment on appropriate Community response to developing warning situations.

DERIVATIVE CL BY   25X  
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 1 Apr 2001  
DERIVED FROM B9c(3)

SECRET

NFAC #1850-81  
1 April 1981

SUBJECT: One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W  
Staff

- iv. To develop plans and procedures for support of the Director of Central Intelligence in crisis situations.
- v. To support the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and the National Foreign Intelligence Board on warning matters.
- vi. To chair the Warning Working Group.
- vii. To oversee the warning activities of the National Intelligence Officers.
- viii. To supervise the Strategic Warning Staff.
- ix. To arrange for intelligence research and production with respect to strategic warning.
- x. To develop a warning consciousness and discipline throughout the Community.
- xi. To seek improvements in methodologies and procedures for warning including communications and dissemination of information.
- xii. To arrange with appropriate organizations of the government for provision to the National Intelligence Officer for Warning and the Strategic Warning Staff of the information they need to carry out their mission.
- xiii. To promote improved analyst training in indications and warning techniques and in other analytic techniques that might contribute to improved warning.
- xiv. To advise the Deputy for Collection Tasking and the Deputy for Resource Management, as appropriate, on warning activities that relate to their responsibilities.

2. The Strategic Warning Staff: The Warning Working Group has approved a plan to disestablish the Strategic Warning Staff and transfer [ ] slots to the NIO/W to form a staff supporting him directly. We will be submitting their recommendation to the DDCI in the next week or so.

3. The NIO/W Staff: Aside from the NIO/W and his assistant, we envision [ ] additional professionals. [ ] of these would be devoted to substantive warning matters (i, ii, iii, v, vii, & ix in paragraph 1.)

SECRET

SUBJECT: One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W  
Staff

NFAC #1850-81

1 April 1981

25X1

A [ ] would be devoted to the care and feeding of the warning "system" (iv, x, xi, xii, xiii and part of xiv in paragraph 1). The [ ] would concentrate on optimizing collection operations in developing crisis situations.

25X1

4. The Fifth Slot: Following are examples of the things for which this person would be responsible. The list is illustrative, not exhaustive.

- The National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net (NOIWON). The A/NIO/W is responsible for this secure conferencing telephone net, our primary means to link the Washington area watch centers together for the rapid exchange of time sensitive information.
- Alert Memoranda procedures. We have a highly structured Community procedure for producing coordinated Alert Memoranda in 24-36 hours. It needs tender loving care.
- DOD's "Focused Warning". DIA, as executive agent for the DCI, is managing a Community project to improve our warning capabilities against a Warsaw Pact attack on NATO. It has subsumed two other Community projects, "WISP" and "Force Packages". This effort will require increasing involvement of the NIO/W.
- A national warning "system". DOD already has an elaborate worldwide warning system consisting of twenty odd 24 hour watch centers. Eventually, we can expect NSA, CIA, and INR (and perhaps the WHSR) to be tied into that network, thus forming a true national "system". Work on this has yet to begin, although some discussions have taken place.
- The Washington Area Operations Centers' Conference. The NIO/W sponsors semiannual meetings attended by the directors of the Washington Area Watch Centers (WHSR, CIA, NSA/NSOC, State, DIA/NMIC, JCS/NMCC, and the four military services). This is a valuable forum for discussing mutual problems and exchanging ideas.
- Budget. Although we have had some success in monitoring warning related budget issues, there is

-3-

SECRET

SECRET

NFAC #1850-81

1 April 1981

SUBJECT: One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W Staff

plenty of room for improvement. This is an enormous task and probably could employ someone full time.

25X1 5. [ ] Slot: The NIO/W should monitor and, when appropriate, influence collection operations during times of impending crisis. For example, if things are heating up in country X and we're becoming a little worried, the NIO/W should find out specifically what collection is taking place and what can be done to improve it. Analysts now levy ad hoc requirements [ ] with little or no supervision, NSA and the DDO operate independently, ELINT often is not even considered, the attaches proceed in blissful ignorance or our concern, etc. We need someone to find out what extraordinary tasking has been levied, why the analysts are asking for specific information (and are they really asking the right questions), and what can be done to tweak the various collectors-- including theatre assets, [ ], [ ], attaches, etc. One 25X1 could argue that the NCPO/Warning should be doing this, but that has not been the case.

25X1 6. An Option: If the NIO/W Staff is expanded as described above, and if [ ] people are assigned tasks as described in paragraphs 4 and 5, and depending on the role assumed by the reconstituted IC Staff, it might be attractive to locate those [ ] people with the IC Staff. They would be 25X1 members of the NIO/W staff and would report to him, but they might be in a better position to carry out their duties if colocated with their resource planning/management and collection management colleagues.

[ ]

25X1

Assistant  
National Intelligence Officer  
for Warning

All Portions of this Memorandum  
are Classified SECRET

SECRET

SUBJECT: One Option for Using an Expanded NIO/W  
Staff

NFAC #1850-81  
1 April 1981

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee  
1 - A/NIO/W Chrono✓  
1 - NFAC Registry

SECRET